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Article 5

RESTORING THE PARAMETERS OF PUBLIC
HEALTH IN A TIME OF HOBBY LOBBY AND
EBOLA: THE CASE FOR A WELLNESS
ACCOUNT
JOHN D. BLUM*
The genesis of this piece lies in two seemingly unrelated events in
law and public health, the governmental response to the Ebola crisis, and
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, sparked by
religious objections to certain employer mandates under the Affordable
Care Act.1 Both episodes raise issues about the behavior of government
authorities in the face of public health need. The presence of Ebola in the
United States raised significant questions about how health agencies should
address a potential population health crisis, and do so in ways that are
respectful of public need and individual liberties.2 In Hobby Lobby, the use
of government power to compel employers to provide eight no-cost
prevention services for women was driven by large-scale public health
considerations addressed in the Affordable Care Act.3 Undoubtedly the
challenges of Ebola and women’s health are very different, but these
matters illustrate the struggle public health regulators face in meeting
population health needs, and balancing such responses with individual
rights. Ebola in the United States, in particular, provides a current and
dramatic example of the legal conflicts that arise when government is
compelled to protect the public in ways that must incorporate group and
individual liberties, together with scientific understanding as foundational
elements of response. The Hobby Lobby case, on the other hand,
demonstrates another perspective on government health policy, illustrating
how other rights beyond due process and equal protection can impact
current public health concerns, as this case interjects the free exercise of
religion into the health discourse.
*
Professor of Law, Beazley Institute for Health Law & Policy, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. See Mark Berman, Reminder: Quarantines Still Can’t Stop Ebola from Getting
into the U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/10/27/reminder-quarantines-still-cant-stop-ebola-from-getting-into-the-u-s/.
3. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
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Hobby Lobby departs from more traditional controversies seen in
public health contexts in which the dilemmas of balancing common good
and individual liberty involve parties immediately impacted by a
government action. In Hobby Lobby, the interests of a third party skew the
balance of rights equation; the Court concerns itself with the challenges of
three privately held corporations, none of whom are the recipients of the
services in question.4 The challengers, under the banner of religious liberty,
defend their rights to their beliefs, as corporate persons, in a fashion that
presents profound challenges to this sector moving health concerns away
from the established rubric of public and private concerns.5 In contrast to
Hobby Lobby, the threat of Ebola in the United States, in spite of all the
problems it caused, sparked debates about response focused on matters of
science, and protection of individual and collective interests.6 In the face of
a potential crisis, it would have been hard to envision a response to Ebola
co-opted by the interests of third parties not immediately threatened by this
disease. While women’s health concerns may not be equated to the threat of
a deadly infectious disease, the considerations underlying prevention and
wellness for more than half our population are central to public health and
should first and foremost be driven by medical science, public need, and
personal choice.
While this essay focuses on the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case and
not Ebola, its core premise is that health policy is best served when
government authorities focus strategies and responses within the parameters
of individual and population concern.7 The Supreme Court, in dealing with
the contraceptive mandate, opened the door to subordinating core public
health interests to third party considerations by adopting a narrow concept
of compelling interest that serves to confound the government role in health
oversight.8 It will be difficult in the current legal climate to overcome the
ascendancy of corporate interests in Hobby Lobby, empowered by the force
of religious exercise, not resting in First Amendment jurisprudence, but in
stringent statutory interpretation. There are legal arguments to be made
against the holding in Hobby Lobby but they are, at best, rather weak as the
4. Id. at 2759.
5. See Laura Bassett & Ryan J. Reilly, Supreme Court Rules in Hobby Lobby Case,
Dealing Blow to Birth Control Coverage, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/supreme-court-hobby-lobby_n_5521444.html
(last updated June 30, 2014, 1:59 PM).
6. See Testing of Potential Ebola Vaccine Begins, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (Feb. 11,
2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/testing-of-potential-ebola-vaccinesbegins/article_3b2bbb88-bb9c-51da-9e88-47443bae3eac.html.
7. Lena H. Sun, Cost to Treat Ebola in the U.S.: $1.16 Million for 2 Patients, WASH.
POST (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/11/18/cost-to-treat-ebola-in-the-u-s-1-16-million-for-2-patients/. As this
headline suggests, the cost of addressing health care issues in traditional boundaries does not
guarantee that the issue at hand will be dealt with in ways that don’t fuel considerable
concerns.
8. See infra Section 1.

2015]

THE CASE FOR A WELLNESS ACCOUNT

121

core statute underpinning the case, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) possesses a high bar, and politics makes it is unlikely that this
law will be amended. Nonetheless, the public’s health necessitates an
approach to women’s health that restores a balance between common good
and the liberties of directly affected individuals.
This piece will propose an alternative approach to women’s health
promotion, a wellness account, which carves out employers from coverage
decisions in the prevention area. Not only will the wellness account
circumvent corporate paternalism in health, it will strengthen the promotion
and prevention goals of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) by more
effectively engaging individuals and clinicians in their own health
decisions, as well as provide coverage options that include a broader array
of health services not routinely available under the law. The essay will be
divided into four sections. Section 1 will review the U. S. Supreme Court
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, highlighting the core findings of the
majority, as well as key points made by the minority. Section 2 will present
some general reflections on the Hobby Lobby case, focusing on the free
exercise of religion issue under RFRA, as well as an exploration of the
compelling interest standard as it relates to women’s health. Section 3 of
the article will explore possible avenues around the legal barriers of Hobby
Lobby through legislative and judicial fixes, as well as alternative approach
to the employer mandate. In Section 4 a proposal will be posited to amend
the ACA to create a lockbox for prevention and wellness services that will
provide a new home for women’s health services including the four
contraceptives that sparked the Hobby Lobby litigation. It will be argued
that removal of the coverage mandate from employer discretion is a way to
restore the parameters of public health to matters of science, public need
and individual patient right.
SECTION 1: THE BASICS OF THE HOLDING
A.

The Majority

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby involved a challenge by three closely held
corporations against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“DHHS”).9 The three corporations involved, Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and
Conestoga Wood Specialties, all large, privately held, family run
companies, alleged that the employer group health insurance mandate in the
Affordable Care Act that required them to provide coverage of four FDA
contraceptive services that were alleged to violate their religious liberty
under both the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, as well and the
9. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. For a detailed overview of Hobby Lobby and the
questions it raises for the free exercise of religion, see DAVID H. GANS & ILYA SHAPIRO,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES FOR CORPORATIONS?: HOBBY LOBBY, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 42–53 (2014).
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).10 Pursuant to
DHHS regulations implementing the ACA, employer group plans are
required to furnish preventive care and screening for women without cost
sharing.11 Non-exempt employers must provide coverage for all twenty
FDA approved contraceptive methods, including four types that were
explicitly signaled out as being antithetical to the religious beliefs of the
three claimants.12 The DHHS contraceptive mandate was not in the statute,
but rather was determined administratively by the Health Resources
Administration (“HRSA”) based on the recommendations of the Institute of
Medicine.13
An important backdrop to the privately held corporate objections
was that two broad types of exemptions to the contraceptive coverage
mandates existed. By law, many large employers and unions did not have to
comply with the no-cost sharing women’s health coverage requirements as
their plans, which existed prior to the ACA, were granted “grandfather
status,” making them exempt from the law’s minimum essential benefits,
which included the contraceptive mandates.14 DHHS had also granted an
exemption to the contraceptive mandate to religious organizations, based on
state law precedents, and later, a partial exemption to non-profit religious
organizations was authorized to forestall a firestorm of controversy
surrounding contraceptive coverage generally.15 In the case of the exempted
organizations, their insurers and third party administrators (“TPAs”) may
exclude contraceptive services from health plan offerings; the coverage
responsibility shifts to the insurance entity or TPA to provide the four
10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
12. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762. The corporate parties objected to four types of
contraceptives; two morning after-pills, Plan B and Ella; and two types of intrauterine
devices (IUDs), arguing that these four prevented implantation and as such were
“abortifacients.” See Jen Gunter, The Medical Facts About Birth Control and Hobby Lobby–
From an OB/GYN, NEW REPUBLIC (July 6, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118547/facts-about-birth-control-and-hobby-lobby-obgyn.
13. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a), (e) (2010). DHHS was responsible for implementing
Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act that covers, prevention and wellness. See
Preventive Services Covered Under the Affordable Care Act, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2010/07/preventive-services-list.html
(last updated Sept. 27, 2012).
15. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013). There is a rather complex history of regulatory
development concerning the exemption of employers from the contraceptive mandate
starting with traditional religious organizations and expanding to non-profit religious
employers. See Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501 (proposed Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45
C.F.R. pt. 147); Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
8,456 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45
C.F.R. pts. 147, 148, 156). To ensure that women are covered by an exempt employer
insured group health plan or self-insured plan, the no-cost coverage requirement for
contraceptives was shifted to insurers and TPAs. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c).
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challenged no cost sharing contraceptives.16 This transference was seen as
budget neutral, due to the savings sparked by these preventive services.17
Both the Hahn (Conestoga Wood) and Green (Hobby Lobby,
Mardel) families sought injunctive relief in federal districts courts, claiming
that their free exercise of religion was infringed on as a result of the DHHS
contraceptive mandate, but in both cases relief was denied.18 The Hahns
appealed their case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, without success,
as that court ruled that a for-profit corporation could not engage in religious
exercise under either RFRA or the First Amendment, and that the mandate
at issue was not one personally directed to the Hahns.19 Things changed in
the federal court of appeals for the Greens, however, as the Tenth Circuit
reversed the lower court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.20 The court
ruled that the Greens’ businesses meet the definition of “persons” under
RFRA, and that they had established the likelihood of success in showing
that the contraceptive mandate was a substantial burden, causing them an
irreparable harm.21 The court held that DHHS did not establish that the
contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive way of furthering the
government’s compelling interest.22 The split in the Third and Tenth
Circuits resulted in the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.23
16. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c).
17. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Health Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,877 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). The July 2, 2013 rules were the culmination of prior
administrative actions in this very controversial area of rule making. See Tyler Hartsfield &
Grace-Marie Turner, 49 Changes to Obamacare . . . So Far, GALEN INST. (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.galen.org/assets/49-Changes-to-ObamaCare . . . So-Far.pdf. In turn, broader
modifications were made for religious non-profit employers who state their objections to
contraceptives, requiring the federal government to take over management of these benefits.
No longer does the objection have to be made to the insurer or TPA, but it can be made
directly to the government. See Kaiser Health News, Religious Employers Offered Fix on
Birth Control Coverage Rules, KAN. HEALTH INST. (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://www.khi.org/news/2014/aug/22/religious-employers-offered-fix-birth-control-cove/.
The July 2, 2013 rules were later amended to allow for greater accommodation to employer
objections. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79
Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,094 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). For an
interesting analysis of the difficulties faced in dealing with the religious objections in the
area of contraceptives, see Emily Bazelon, Nice Try, Obama, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 26, 2014,
12:24 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/obama_s_new_cont
raception_mandate_accommodation_religious_employers_are.html.
18. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400 (E.D. Pa.
2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296 (W.D. Okla.
2012).
19. Conestoga Wood Specialties v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013).
20. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1144.
23. Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
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The Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case, which joined together the
Greens’ and the Hahns’ religious objections, was based not on a
constitutional consideration of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause,
but rather was grounded in the Court’s interpretation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.24 Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga
corporations argued to the Court that RFRA prohibits the government from
substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion unless it is able
to shown that the burden in question is both driven by a compelling interest,
and constitutes the least restrictive means available to achieve the public
goals at issue.25
In ruling in favor of the three privately held corporations, the
majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, covered three significant areas.
First, the Court reached several related conclusions about the feasibility of
the religious infringement claim under RFRA. The majority ruled that
RFRA applies to closely held for-profit corporations, rejecting the
government’s positions that the three companies could not sue under this
law because they are for-profit entities, and that the owners could not
challenge the regulations, at issue, as they applied only to companies, and
not individuals.26 The Court reasoned that the DHHS position on the
viability of the RFRA challenges placed these merchants in a very difficult
situation, forcing them to give up their rights to seek judicial protection of
their religious liberty or forego the benefits of operating as a corporation.
Additionally, the majority held that nothing in RFRA forced a departure
from the Dictionary Act definition of “person” including corporations.27
The Court rejected the DHHS position that a for-profit corporation could
not seek protection under RFRA, as the government had conceded that nonprofits could be considered “persons” under the Act.28
The Hobby Lobby majority reasoned that state laws authorized
corporations to pursue any lawful purpose or business, including the pursuit
of profit in conformity with the owner’s religious principles.29 The Court
further reasoned that First Amendment jurisprudence was not reversed by
RFRA to a time when corporate rights in the religious context had not been
addressed, rather this law, and its progeny, created independent religious
rights that could clearly include for-profit corporations within its ambit.30
24. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
25. Id. at 2779; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
26. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
27. Id. at 2768.
28. Id. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–8 (2014). See also Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), in which the Court allowed a
RFRA claim of a non-profit to proceed.
29. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
30. Id. at 2772–74. RFRA was enacted in 1993 in reaction to the Supreme Court
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). RFRA is often viewed as a statute, which rolls back the law in this area to the preSmith era in which for-profit corporations did not make claims for First Amendment Free
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The Court rejected the government’s claim that it could not ascertain the
sincerity of corporate (religious) beliefs, reasoning that in other contexts
(i.e., prisoners religious liberty claims) such determinations are made by
federal courts, and that here too, the Court reasoned that state law affords
guidance as to the limits of acceptable corporate governance.31 DHHS did
not question the sincerity of the Greens’ and Hahns’ religious beliefs that
life begins at conception, nor their religious opposition to the highlighted
four contraceptives, but the agency called into question how such beliefs
could be determined in a corporation, guided by a leadership structure that
may have conflicting views on such matters.32
The second major element in the Hobby Lobby ruling concerned the
question of whether the three companies’ religious liberty was
“substantially burdened” by the contraceptive mandate. In order for a
successful RFRA claim to be brought the complaining parties must
demonstrate that the government action, at issue, is a substantial burden on
the free exercise of religion.33 The Court in Hobby Lobby was persuaded
that the burden was substantial, based on the size of the statutory fines that
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga would face if they offered health
insurance that failed to provide the four contraceptive services.34 Amici in
the case raised the argument that the three companies could avoid the fines
by dropping health insurance and paying a $2,000 penalty per employee; a
payment obligation resulting from employees purchasing their own health
insurance on government exchanges.35 The government, however, never
mounted the argument that the three companies could have circumvented
their religious objections by forcing their employees onto public exchanges,
thus mitigating their burden.36 Nonetheless, the Court did note that using
the exchanges, as a way to reduce the companies’ substantial burden would
have been unpersuasive.37 According to the Court, the plaintiffs offered
health insurance for both religious reasons, as well as for conventional
business considerations, and the decision to offer health coverage was a
long standing one made by the three companies prior to the Affordable Care
Act.38 The Hobby Lobby majority expressed doubt that the Congress, either
Exercise protection. The Court rejected this premise as they pointed out in Hobby Lobby that
in the pre-Smith era, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Markets of Massachusetts, Inc., 366
U.S. 617 (1961) demonstrates that for-profit corporations can exercise religion. Id. at 2772.
31. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75.
32. Id. at 2774.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
34. The Court estimated that the fines would be annually $475 million for Hobby
Lobby, $15 million for Mardel, and $33 million for Conestoga. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at
2776.
35. Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting the Government at
22, Hobby Lobby,134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
36. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court never explained its conclusion that the three companies saw religion,
in and of itself, as a motivating factor to offer employee health benefits.
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through RFRA or the ACA, would place privately held corporations in a
situation where they had to choose between violating sincerely held
religious principles and forcing their employees to lose existing health care
coverage.39
The Court also rejected a key government argument that the
connection between the religious beliefs and actual use of the four
contraceptives was too attenuated.40 Rather, the Court characterized the
Greens’ and the Hahns’ perception that their religion and moral philosophy
was violated by the contraceptive mandate as sincere; according to the
Court, characterizing this belief as insubstantial or minimal in its practical
import, was not within the purview of the federal courts.41 As such, the
Court found a direct link between the religious objections of the parties to
the mandate, and the possible eventuality that it could lead to the actual use
of one of the four objectionable contraceptives.
The third key element in the Court’s decision concerns whether the
government was able to justify the substantial burden on religious liberty
under RFRA,42 and consideration of the viability of the DHHS
justifications. Under the dictates of RFRA, based on constitutional
jurisprudence, DHHS was required to demonstrate that the contraceptive
mandate was motivated by a compelling interest, and that the regulatory
approach taken, constituted the least restrictive means of achieving the goal
in question.43 Although there is overwhelming evidence underpinning the
value of women’s access to contraceptives, the Court never dealt with the
public health, or gender equity, arguments made by DHHS in considering
the “compelling interest” question, but rather characterized these defenses
as far too broad.44 The Court’s opinion focused more extensively on
determining whether mandating employers to provide health insurance, that
included the four contraceptives at issue, was the least restrictive means
available to achieve this goal of offering these services.45 Under the ACA,
large numbers of employers, through grandfathering provisions, and
subsequent administrative exemptions for religious entities, had been
carved out of the contraceptive mandate.46 DHHS had created an exemption
for non-profit religious employers that transferred the no-cost coverage
responsibility to insurance issuers and third-party administrators.47 The
Court identified this type of exemption as a model, which was less
restrictive than the one proposed for the challengers.48 The government
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 2777.
Id. at 2777–78.
Id. at 2779.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
Id. at 2761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)).
Id. at 2779.
Id. at 2780–83.
Id. at 2763–64. See § 18011(a), (e) (2012).
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) (2013).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
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countered with the argument that enforcement of RFRA could not serve as
a justification for new expenditures to create a less restrictive enforcement
scheme.49 The Court strongly rejected the expenditure argument, holding
that both RFRA, and its sister statute, RLUIPA (Religious Land Use
Institutionalized Persons Act), could, in the interests of the free exercise of
religion, require the expenditure of additional public funds, and such
position was in compliance with Congressional intent.50 While the majority
did not specify an exact approach that would meet the “least restrictive
means test,” it did reject the strategy of having employers drop health
insurance as a way to avoid religious conflict; in the eyes of the Court, this
would constitute a greater impediment to a woman seeking contraceptive
services.51
In crafting its ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the majority was
careful to frame its opinion narrowly by limiting its decision under RFRA
to privately held corporations.52 But, as pointed out in the minority opinion,
it is not entirely clear that the same reasoning applied in Hobby Lobby
could not be adopted in a similar, future RFRA challenge, brought by a
publically traded corporation.53 The majority was quite adamant that there
was no boundary in RFRA that limited its application to a natural person,
but rather the term “person” appears to permit claims by a wide array of
actors, including for-profit corporations.54 The Court stressed that the
decision only applied to the religious challenge against the contraceptive
mandate, and was not to be read as opening the door to free exercise
objections to other public health measures such as mandatory vaccines, or
as a ruse to sanction employment discrimination.55 The Court noted that the
RFRA compelling interest test was robust enough to act as a litmus test to
balance religious liberty claims against competing interests more
generally.56 But the existence of a balancing test, no matter how artful it
maybe, does not preclude other claimants from pursuing their free exercise
claims, spurred on by the success of the three parties in Hobby Lobby.
B.

The Minority

Justice Ginsburg authored a bitter dissent, illustrating how badly
divided the Court was along political and gender lines.57 Several key points
49. Id. at 2781.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2783.
52. Id. at 2785.
53. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2759.
55. Id. at 2783–84.
56. Id. at 2784–85.
57. The decision was a 5–4 split with the dissent representing the liberal factions of
the Court, in addition to reflecting a gender divide as all three women on the Court joined in
the dissenting opinion.
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were stressed in the dissent starting with a much more careful articulation
and support for the Women’s Health Amendment that had acted as the
catalyst of the contraceptive mandate.58 The dissent did not characterize
RFRA as a starting point in the exploration of the legal analysis of
government burdens on free exercise, but rather viewed it as a point of
return to the body of constitutional jurisprudence that existed prior to this
statute.59 Justice Ginsburg argued that not only had a compelling interest
standard been in existence before RFRA, but so too had the least restrictive
means requirement.60 The dissent took issue with the majority’s conclusion
that a religion-based exemption could be expanded to a for-profit
corporation.61 The pre-Smith rulings, relied on by the majority, make no
mention of such a dramatic expansion to for-profit entities, and according to
Justice Ginsburg, had that been Congress’ intent, it would have been
clarified in the RFRA statute.62 The dissent also voiced concern that there is
no way to limit the expansion of “person” to only closely held corporations,
but the logic of the ruling extends to corporations of any size, public or
private.63 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg noted that placing the courts into
the role of deciphering the validity of particular religious objections made
by for-profit corporations would be venturing into a judicial minefield, and
could run afoul of the other pillar of religious freedom, the Establishment
Clause.64
The dissent was troubled by the viability of the connection between
the Greens’ and Hahns’ religious objections to the contraceptive mandate
and the nature of the burden placed on them.65 Justice Ginsburg noted that
the obligation placed on the challengers was to direct money to
undifferentiated funds that finance a wide array of benefits under
comprehensive health plans.66 The actual decision to use a contraceptive is
one between an employee and her physician, making the religious objection
of the three closely held corporations less than a substantial burden. The
58. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2791. In the eyes of the dissent, RFRA and the RLUIPA amendment to
RFRA, restored free exercise jurisprudence to a time before Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith abandoned earlier
free exercise jurisprudence holding that when government regulations impacted religion,
such impact, if it was incidental to a regulation that was generally applicable, and otherwise
valid, was permissible. Earlier Court rulings such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) required the government to justify any
substantial burden on religion by a compelling state interest and by adopting means narrowly
tailored to reach that interest. RFRA and RLUIPA restored the pre-Smith test and allowed
federal courts to rely on earlier jurisprudence for guidance. See id. at 2772–74.
60. Id. at 2792–93.
61. Id. at 2793–96.
62. Id. at 2796.
63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797.
64. Id. at 2805.
65. Id. at 2799.
66. Id.
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dissent argued that the third-party nature of the claim was one not
envisioned by Congress under RFRA; the decision in question was made by
an individual and was not a direct issue that arose in the relationship
between the three corporations and the government.67 Even if the burden on
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga was found to be substantial, the
dissent was persuaded that the compelling public health interest outweighs
the employer objections, and that no prior decision has allowed a RFRA
based exemption to harm the interests of others, particularly those whom
the law is designed to protect.68 The dissenters rejected alternative payment
mechanisms for contraceptives, endorsed by the majority, arguing that the
ACA scheme for preventive services rested on the employer health
insurance system and that moving away from that structure would impede
women’s access to health services.69
SECTION II: REFLECTIONS
A.

The Corporatization of Religion

Undoubtedly the legal heart of the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case
concerns the free exercise of religion, claimed by the three corporate
challengers, versus the right of the government to be able to regulate
employer health plans to achieve public health goals. While free exercise
jurisprudence, unlike due process and equal protection, is not the daily
fodder of constitutional concerns in public health law policy formation, it is
nonetheless an area that has been the subject of long-standing and frequent
concern.70 Generally disputes that occur at the intersection of health and
constitutional law pit parties who claim individual rights, such as religion,
against government authorities acting in the interests of the public.
Individuals and religious organizations, under the banner of the First
Amendment, and more recently RFRA, argue that their right to engage in
certain conduct, or their exemption from various public mandates, be
protected by their right to exercise their religious freedom.71
Most often, there are three types of challenges that can be found in
health care contexts that typify the nature of religiously based disputes:
challenges that involve regulations, proscriptive directives, and compulsory
67. Id.
68. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799–2801.
69. Id. at 2802.
70. See Breitta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious
Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82
OR. L. REV. 641 (2003).
71. Such challenges can also be brought under state law, as state constitutions
recognize the free exercise of religion and all states have enacted their own versions of
RFRA. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs,
55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010); Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses
Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2013).
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actions, respectively. There exists a wide array of subject matter disputes;
from objections to mandatory vaccines, disease testing and reporting, to
blood transfusions, bans on polygamy, etc., which populate this area. Of
particular note are the commonly encountered controversies involving
third-party health care institutions or individual health professionals, who as
a matter of conscience, driven by a religious or moral objection, refuse to
provide certain types of care, typically, those involving women’s health
services (contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization, and
termination of pregnancy). The ability of individuals and institutions to
refuse to provide services, based on religious beliefs, has been underpinned
by the passage of state statutes in the area, along with the issuance of
federal regulations to that effect.72 From the rights of providers to limit
services, issues of conscience have expanded into payment matters as
employers, primarily religiously sponsored, have argued that specific
employee health benefits that require contraceptives to be covered must be
excluded if they conflict with religious doctrine.73 The Obama
Administration adopted contraceptive coverage exclusion, first developed
in the states, as a special concession to religiously based corporations that
primarily employ and serve those of the same faith.74 The corporate
exclusions for religious organizations fit within the framework of free
exercise jurisprudence, but when exclusions are sought by for-profit
companies, that espouse strong religious values, like Hobby Lobby, the law
concerning freedom of religion enters into a previously unprecedented
arena.
What makes the ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby feasible is that
the case is brought within the parameters of RFRA, as opposed to a First
Amendment challenge. The Court in Hobby Lobby may have been able to
frame its decision on precedent but it would have had to reject the rational
basis test of Employment Division v. Smith, and reconfirm the strict scrutiny
72. See Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause:
The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779 (2007); see also Maria Cirincione, Maryland’s Conscience Clause:
Leaving a Woman’s Right to Health Care Provider’s Choice, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 171 (2010). Federal regulations concerning religious and moral refusal to treat can be
found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 88.1–88.2 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 238n
(1996); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2209
(2007). These references are to conscience clauses that are directed toward abortion services.
Conscience clauses have been issues of contention pitting more conservative religious
interests against liberal policy makers. See Kelleen Patricia Forlizzi, State Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts as a Solution to the Free Exercise Problem of Religiously Based
Refusals to Administer Health Care, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 387 (2010).
73. Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 304 (2014).
74. Id. at 307. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76
Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt.
2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
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analysis it had developed in Sherbert. RFRA, however, gave the Court a
statutory avenue to avoid such judicial rationalizing, and through this law,
the Hobby Lobby majority was able to follow an alternative pathway.
Two key factors stand out in the RFRA analysis. First, the Court
found that RFRA was not restricted to individuals and religious entities, but
that corporations, operating under the color of state law, could pursue
profits in conformity with the religious values of their owners.75 Thus
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga, as for-profit corporations, were
protected by RFRA, and as such, had the opportunity to make the case, that
as covered entities, their religious rights were illegally burdened by having
to meet a mandate that was an affront to those beliefs. Even more
significant than recognition of the three businesses as RFRA persons, was
the fact that their claim was placed in a pre-Smith context that required the
application of a strict scrutiny test.76 Second, the Court accepted the
Greens’ and the Hahns’ expression of faith and reiterated it without
question, as the judicial role requires only a finding of an “honest
conviction.”77 The sincerity of the religious claim, coupled with the
economic harm suffered by the challengers’ free exercise, combined to
infringe on the religious liberty of the parties.78 Once a substantial burden
was demonstrated, the onus under a RFRA claim shifts to the government
to show that the regulation at issue is supported by a compelling interest,
and that the regulatory approach followed is the least restrictive means
available.79 RFRA supplants the rational basis test adopted in Smith, one
that would have been easier for DHHS to meet in making the public health
case for contraceptives. Under the less stringent rational basis test, the
exercise of religion can be impacted by the government action at issue,
provided this action is neutral; its object is not the suppression of religion,
or religious conduct, and the particular action is generally applicable.80 But
under the strict scrutiny standard of RFRA, a compelling interest has to be
75. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
76. Id. at 2772–74.
77. Id. at 2778. A couple of curious matters have been identified in the commentary on
the Hobby Lobby case that raise questions about the sincerity of the challengers religious
beliefs and suggests that the religious convictions of the Hahns and the Greens may be
somewhat new found. Both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood covered the morning after
pills that the parties objected to in their employee health benefit plans; it was only after the
passage of the Affordable Care Act that these employers objected to providing such
coverage. An article in Mother Jones magazine noted that the employee 401(k) retirement
plan, which Hobby Lobby contributed to, held more than $73 million in mutual funds with
investments in companies that produce emergency contraceptive, intrauterine devices, and
drugs commonly used in abortions. Molly Redden, Hobby Lobby’s Hypocrisy: The
Company’s Retirement Plan Invests in Contraception Manufacturers, MOTHER JONES (Apr.
1, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/hobby-lobby-retirementplan-invested-emergency-contraception-and-abortion-drug-makers.
78. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
79. Id. at 2751.
80. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993).
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demonstrated that goes beyond a general public health case in support of
women’s health prevention and wellness.81 Rather, a compelling interest
standard requires an explicit demonstration that placing a burden on the free
exercise of religion of the three specific corporations was necessary to solve
the public health problem at issue, something the government failed to do in
Hobby Lobby.82
Compounding the difficulty in demonstrating a specific compelling
interest was the further legal requirement that DHHS must show that its
approach to the matter of contraceptives, that burdened the parties’ freedom
of religion, was the least restrictive means available to deal with this
matter.83 Here, the Agency was confronted with a major challenge, as the
ACA allowed existing employer and union plans to be grandfathered out of
minimum essential benefit requirements, including the provision
concerning cost free contraceptives.84 Equally significant was the fact that,
by regulation, an expanded number of organizations, starting with religious
employers, were exempted from the contraceptive mandate.85 These
exemptions were further expanded through a temporary safe-harbor;
accommodations extended the range of exempted organizations to include a
wide array of non-profit religious entities, such as hospitals and educational
institutions. For these exempted employers, their workers are afforded
alternative access to contraceptive services, as the no cost coverage
contraceptive mandate was passed on to the employer’s insurers and third
party administrators, who become responsible for this obligation.86 The
many exemptions, waivers, and accommodations made it difficult for
DHHS to convincingly argue that the contraceptive mandate could not be
accommodated in a fashion similar to what was done for a wide swath of
employers. The Court concluded that a least restrictive approach required
the government to assume the cost of providing contraceptives, and that
RFRA, and its companion statute RLUIPA, posed no barrier to an
additional expenditure that would protect religious liberty.87

81. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
82. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Unia do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
83. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1997).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a), (e) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(c) (2010).
85. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
86. Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8,456,
8,462 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45
C.F.R. pts. 147, 148, 156).
87. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014). The Court
did not rely on its conclusion that additional funding would be appropriate to further
religious rights under RFRA but rather was persuaded that a least restrictive means existed
based on the DHHS policy that allowed religious organizations to opt out of the
contraceptive mandate by a process of self-certification. Id. at 2782 (citing 45 C.F.R.
§ 147.131(b)(4), (c)(1) (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2713A(a)(4), (b) (2014)).
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Recapturing the Compelling Interest

Lost in the haze of religious objections and the jurisprudence of
RFRA was the underlying public health imperative that underpinned the
contraceptive mandate.88 As noted the Court never seriously dealt with the
DHHS position that the contraceptive mandate promoted public health, and
gender equity, as it concluded that such arguments were too broad and
lacked the requisite specificity demanded by RFRA. But in passing, the
Court conceded that it was likely the government had a compelling interest
in providing no cost contraceptives, but that assumption was short lived, as
it faltered on the second prong of RFRA, the least restrictive means test.89
The majority, in zealously protecting the RFRA religious rights of the
Hahns’ and the Greens’, relegated the interests of women’s health to the
status of a lesser concern, and in the process willingly compromised the
employer based structure of the ACA.
The minority opinion, on the other hand, is rooted in its support for
public health and women’s well being as a compelling interest that drives
its legal reasoning and colors its arguments in support of the contraceptive
mandate. As noted by the minority, the Women’s Health Amendment,
which led to the contraceptive mandate, was an addition to the ACA, in
recognition that cost barriers impeded many women from obtaining
necessary medical care.90 The so-called Mikulski Amendment, expanded
one of the ACA’s core areas of focus, preventive services, broadly
requiring new insurance plans to include coverage, without cost sharing, for
women’s preventive care and screening services, a position taken by the
Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) of DHHS.91
HRSA based its women’s preventive health services coverage policies on
the conclusions of field experts from the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”)
who recommended that the full range of FDA approved contraceptives
methods be provided, under the ACA, without cost.92 The IOM in its
detailed study of women’s preventive health needs, pointed out that for
purposes of medical care, women were under greater financial strain than
men, and that an employer’s failure to provide cost free access to
contraceptives could have adverse health consequences.93 Adopting HRSA
88. See id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2779–80 (majority opinion).
90. 155 CONG. REC. 28,841 (2009). See also Colleen Connell et al., Religious Refusals
Under the Affordable Care Act: Contraception as Essential Health Care, 15 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 1, 7–8 (2013).
91. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725, 8727-28 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45
C.F.R. pt. 147).
92. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTION SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS
109–10 (2011).
93. Id. at 19.
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guidelines, the three agencies—DHHS, Treasury, and Labor—issued
regulations requiring group health plans to include coverage, without cost
sharing, for contraceptives, sterilization procedures, patient education, and
counseling.94 It was quite clear from the minority opinion, and the twentythree amicus briefs in support of the government, that the contraceptive
mandate was seen both as a major pillar of public health and a matter of
gender rights.95 Justice Ginsburg stressed that the compelling interest of the
government was met, even if the concern at issue involved only four of
twenty contraceptive methods.96 Ginsburg emphasized that the cost
considerations in obtaining the four contraceptives, particularly in the case
of intrauterine devices (IUDs), posed a deterrent to access.97 In the debate
surrounding the Women’s Health Amendment, the Senate had rejected a
conscience rider to these amendments that would have allowed any
employer, or health insurer, the ability to deny contraceptive coverage on
the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions;98 this rider was
characterized as an inappropriate interference with the practice of
medicine.99
While there is a fair amount of detail interlaced throughout the
Hobby Lobby decision that supports a compelling case for public health,
albeit unsuccessfully in the eyes of the majority, the medicine underpinning
the challengers’ objections to the four contraceptives never received its day
in court. The Hahns and the Greens narrowed their religious objections to
four contraceptives: two so-called morning after pills (Plan B and Ella) and
two IUDs, labeling them as abortifacients.100 The medical community has
taken issue with the conclusion of the three corporations in Hobby Lobby,
arguing that the four contraceptives in question don’t prevent implantation
or fertilization, but rather prevent ovulation, thus not constituting abortioninducing devices.101 In the Amicus Brief of nine medical societies,
including the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, it was
pointed out that the characterization of the four birth control devices as
anything but contraceptives did not comport with the weight of scientific

94. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, supra note 85.
95. See, e.g., Brief of the Guttmacher Institute and Professor Sara Rosenbaum as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Government, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356).
96. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing the opinion
that the Court’s reasoning could permit commercial enterprises to refuse to provide all
contraceptives).
97. Id.
98. 158 CONG. REC. S539 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2012).
99. 158 CONG. REC. S1127 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mikulski).
100. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
101. Joerg Dreweke, Contraception Is Not About Abortion: The Strategic Campaign of
Antiabortion Groups to Persuade the Public Otherwise, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Fall
2014, at 14, 15.
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evidence.102 The science, however, was not at issue in the case, as
paradoxically, the only related point of legal inquiry rested on the sincerity
of the corporate challengers,103 and the stance taken by the parties seemed
to suffice; the fact that the operative religious beliefs were based on faulty
medical information had no relevance to the Court in its deliberations of the
RFRA claim.
C.

Hobby Lobby in a Broader Context

While the Court may not have needed to probe the scientific
underpinnings of the religious beliefs of the owners of Hobby Lobby,
Mardel, or Conestoga, it would be odd to imagine that these large
employers were not aware of the tenuous nature of their medical claims that
the four contraceptives at issue are abortifacients. As such, it is plausible
that the motivations driving the parties in the Hobby Lobby case may be
found in a deeper opposition to contraception and abortion generally, or
perhaps the case is better understood in the context of broad employer
opposition to the Affordable Care Act, and is part of a legacy of actions that
attack key provisions of this law. As far as the wider abortion debate, it has
been suggested that anti-abortion groups are no longer solely focused on
issues of “personhood,” but have broadened their strategy to include
opposition to contraceptives as being abortifacients.104 The assault on
contraceptives does not go so far as to support an argument that existing
abortion laws should be expanded to cover contraceptives generally. It
does, however, open the possibility that targeted contraceptive methods,
such as IUDs or the morning after pill, will be treated under the umbrella of
abortion, adding additional layers of bureaucratic complexity that could
dissuade women from obtaining these services.105
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby is an assault on one of the core pillars of
the ACA, the employer mandate. While Hobby Lobby contests only a small
and discrete obligation of group insurance coverage, nonetheless, it
represents a challenge to the integrity of the employer-based scheme. This
successful challenge has not been a death nail to health reform, but sets a
precedent that weakens the public commitment to women’s health, and
invites future coverage challenges by third-party employers along similar
grounds.106 The case can be viewed in conjunction with two other Supreme
102. Brief of Amici Curiae Physicians for Reproductive Health et al, in Support of
Petitioners at 11, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
103. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
104. Dreweke, supra note 101, at 18.
105. Id.
106. There are now a number of challenges that are likely to be heard. See Challenges
to the Federal Contraceptive Coverage Rule, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/challenges-federal-contraceptive-coverage-rule.
For example, in Newland v. Sebelius, a Colorado federal district court permanently enjoined
the federal government from enforcing contraceptive coverage regulations in the case of
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Court challenges, as an accidental or deliberate strategy, which further
erodes foundational principle of the ACA.107 In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the best-known challenge to the ACA, a
coalition of businesses attacked the law’s individual mandate as being in
violation of the commerce clause, and the ACA expansion of Medicaid as
being at odds with the federal spending power, both areas constituting key
features of health reform.108 While the Court upheld the individual mandate
under the taxing power, the ACA was damaged by the finding that the
Medicaid expansion was coercive and constituted an abuse of the
Congress’s spending power.109 A third major case, emerging from four
federal court actions brought by employers and individual taxpayers, King
v. Burwell, was heard by the Supreme Court in the 2015 spring term; the
case concerns the legality of an IRS rule that allows premium subsidies for
individuals purchasing health insurance on Federally Facilitated
Marketplaces.110 At its root the King case is an Administrative Procedure
Act dispute, concerning agency abuse of discretion in the implementation
of the ACA tax credit provisions.111 The challengers in King argue that the
plain meaning rule must dictate the interpretation of ACA language as
limiting health insurance subsidies only to state run insurance
marketplaces.112 If the Court rules in favor of the challengers, it is estimated
that health insurance could become unaffordable for many of the 7.3

Hercules Corporation, a privately held family-run corporation, similar to Hobby Lobby. 881
F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290 (D. Colo. 2012). The permanent injunction does not, however,
prevent the government from applying modified regulations in this area.
107. MaryBeth Musumeci & Laurie Sobel, The Federal Courts’ Role in Implementing
the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2014),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8630-the-federal-courts-role-inimplementing-the-affordable-care-act.pdf.
108. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
109. Id. at 2608–09.
110. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475
(2014). See also Musumeci & Sobel, supra note 107 (analyzing the potential consequences).
111. Michael F. Cannon, Seven Myths About King v. Burwell, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 10,
2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-seven-myths-about-kingv-burwell/.
112. King, 759 F.3d at 368. But see Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 399 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (holding that the language of the ACA did not authorize tax credits for the federally
funded exchange). Halbig was decided initially by a three-judge panel of the D.C. Court of
Appeals and the initial ruling stood in contrast to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in King. Id. The Fourth Circuit in King held that the language at issue concerning
health insurance subsidies was ambiguous, giving the IRS flexibility to interpret the statute
in a reasonable fashion. 759 F.3d at 375. Interestingly enough the full appeals court in the
D.C. Court of Appeals vacated their three judge order but nonetheless the Court agreed to
hear this case, leading to widespread speculation about motives. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck,
King v. Burwell Isn’t About Obamacare, POLITICOMAGAZINE (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/king-v-burwell-states-rights115550.html#.VR6x8DvF8YI.
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million who are expected to receive federal subsidies in 2016.113 In
addition, without subsidies, healthier individuals may decide to drop
coverage leaving federal exchanges with sicker and costlier enrollees. As
such, a ruling in King that strikes down agency discretion would seriously
cripple the ACA’s goal of expanding health insurance coverage and further
subject the reform scheme to the idiosyncrasies of federalism.114 While each
of the three cases noted present distinct challenges to the ACA, to date,
collectively, they constitute the most significant legal challenges against the
reform law and represent a body of cases underpinned by very strong
corporate opposition to key elements of Obamacare.
SECTION III: GOING FORWARD
Whatever the motivations underlying Hobby Lobby—abortion
politics, opposition to the ACA, or the corporatization of religious liberty—
the impacts of the decision on women’s health and the employer mandate
are troubling. Perhaps the most disturbing implication of Hobby Lobby is
that it elevates the interests of a third party to a level of import that
confounds the abilities of government to craft public health policy within
the traditional framework that balances individual liberties against
population need. As previously noted, the Ebola outbreak was a stark
reminder that public health policy is urgent, and in the chaos of the moment
a clear understanding of legal power, the legitimate role of science, and the
parameters of public and private interests are critical for effective
governance.115 In this regard, the Ebola outbreak, for all of its messiness,
serves as a reminder that a focus, on the noted core elements, is what should
drive health policy. One would be hard pressed in the Ebola context to
argue that a philosophical or moral concern should impede authorities from
taking whatever actions are necessary to protect the common good.
Unquestionably religion is a core liberty that must be respected, but that
liberty rests with an individual’s free exercise, and to embellish this right
for the benefit of an artificial structure, a for-profit business, is problematic
for both the law and population health. The fact that public
accommodations can be found to appease the interests of a third-party
employer is not a necessary or appropriate compromise, but rather weakens
the government’s role at a time when public health threats are ever present,
expanding and potentially cataclysmic. In addition, the Court does a grave
113. Adrianna McIntyre, Halbig: Obamacare’s Big, New Legal Challenge, Explained,
VOX, http://www.vox.com/2014/7/22/5821600/obamacare-halbig-subsidies-illegal-moststates (last updated July 22, 2014, 11:30 AM).
114. Id. A ruling against the IRS in King could lead to a growing number of states
adopting their own health insurance exchanges as a way to avoid widespread abandonment
of coverage because of premium increases. For a discussion concerning various strategies
that could be employed in light of a Court ruling against the legality of subsidies on federal
exchanges, see Musumeci & Sobel, supra note 107.
115. See Berman, supra note 2.
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disservice to women’s health, sacrificing this critical arena of public health
to the vicissitudes of belief, rendering medicine and professional judgment
secondary to convictions based on principles outside the realm of evidenced
based analyses.
Given the dire implications of Hobby Lobby for public health, the
questions arise about what can be done to restore appropriate governance in
this area. To this end, three possible approaches come to mind, none of
which will be easily accomplished, but all of which deserve consideration
as possible avenues around this holding. The first approach involves a
legislative fix through statutory amendments to RFRA. The Court was quite
adamant that in its interpretation of the Dictionary Act that the term
“person” in RFRA was not limited to natural persons, but could include an
array of entities including corporations, leaving the impression that any
business entity would qualify for protections afforded by this law.116 The
Court reasoned that if the Congress wanted to limit the scope of RFRA, it
would have done so in the statutory language.117 The concession by DHHS
that “person” within the RFRA context encompassed a non-profit
corporation placed the government in a difficult position, making an
argument that the RFRA person was restricted an unlikely conclusion.118
While the notion that a for-profit corporation can exercise religious freedom
in a way that trumps a public program seems odd, RFRA is silent on this
point and the judicial interpretation of inclusiveness, in the absence of
specific language to the contrary, is hard to overcome. Narrowing the scope
of RFRA to include only natural persons, as the minority suggests, is an end
that could only be achieved by amending the language of this statute.119 It
would appear based on the expansive nature of RFRA that a roll back of the
law to limit its application to natural persons and non-profit religious
organizations would be politically unfeasible.120
A second approach to changing the ruling in Hobby Lobby would
be for the Court to alter its approaches to RFRA and the free exercise clause
generally. Two possible avenues emerge; one would be the return to the
jurisprudence of Smith, and the other would be the re-adoption of a
balancing test for deciding questions of government infringement on
religious rights. Such judicial alterations in the RFRA context would be
rather difficult in lieu of the fact that a core purpose of the law was to
override Smith, returning to an earlier jurisprudence that utilized a
compelling interest standard. To turn the clock back on RFRA, without
amending this law, would require the Court to adopt a much narrower view
116. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014). Interestingly, Hobby
Lobby was a company that was held in a management trust and in effect the Court expanded
the status of RFRA person to the trust as well. Id. at 2765 n.15.
117. Id. at 2768.
118. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354), at 7–
8.
119. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. The politics of RFRA don’t seem favorable to a narrowing of the law.
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of the statute than was the case in Hobby Lobby.121 For a pure First
Amendment constitutional challenge, independent of RFRA, it would be
more plausible, though unlikely, for the Court to continue the Smith
decision seeing that the case still holds precedential value.122 Use of the
Smith balancing test, that saves neutral and generally applicable laws from
strict scrutiny, would be an easier bar for the government to meet in support
of employer coverage mandates. Under a balancing test only laws directly
targeting religious beliefs would be in jeopardy, and laws that place a
burden on religion, as a secondary impact, could stand.123 Based on the
reasoning of the minority opinion in Hobby Lobby, that found a compelling
interest in the government’s case under RFRA, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the necessary elements of the Smith rational basis standard
could be satisfied, in support of a broad, generic women’s health mandate,
should such a standard be revised.
The fusing of RFRA and the First Amendment, as demonstrated by
Hobby Lobby, makes it unlikely that the Court, in light of its current
jurisprudence, will return to a rational basis test followed in Smith.124 As
such, the question arises as to whether there is another possible way for the
Court to reach a different result, using the three elements of RFRA, resting
on the long-standing Sherbert test, but following the reasoning voiced by
Justice Ginsburg. Outside of federal courts, guidance for a different
interpretation of the three-part rational basis test can be found in
consideration of state court free exercise jurisprudence. States have adopted
a more stringent view of the freedom of religion, using federal law as a
floor on which to build stricter free exercise policies, resting on the
idiosyncrasies of a given state’s constitution.125 For example, Article 1,
Section 11 of the Washington State Constitution provides a more
affirmative protection of the freedom of religion than the First
Amendment.126 Washington State’s constitutional law broadly limits
government power that both directly, and indirectly, impacts the free
121. RFRA clearly requires that before the Government can impose a substantial
burden on free exercise rights, there needs to be a showing of compelling interest and least
restrictive means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
122. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). See also Thomas C. Berg,
Free Exercise of Religion, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION,
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/1/essays/139/free-exercise-of-religion
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
123. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
124. This is not to suggest that the federal courts will categorically reject a Smith
analysis, as that possibility still exists. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th
Cir. 2009).
125. See Linton, supra note 71, at 84.
126. “Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed
in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace and safety of the state.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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exercise of religion, subjecting challenged actions to a strict scrutiny
analysis.127 Interestingly Washington State rejected the balancing approach
of Smith, and adopted the older Sherbert test for state constitutionality
purposes in Munns v. Martin, a standard that mirrors the federal RFRA
law.128 But unlike the federal application of strict scrutiny, driven by a
narrow, targeted, compelling interest, Washington State courts have been
more accommodating than their federal counterparts, allowing laws that
promote medical services to stand in the interests of the public’s health,
provided that they are narrowly tailored.129 It appears in the Washington
situation that the state police power function, that broadly drives health
regulation, may serve as a motivating variable, and even in the face of strict
scrutiny, religiously based objections can be set aside in the face of health
needs. While police power is rooted in the concept of federalism,130 the
goals of governments at all levels is to promote population interests,131 and
in that vein courts may give deference to those efforts yielding to legitimate
public health purposes, even in the face of strict scrutiny analysis. State
jurisprudence, such as that noted in Washington State, may prove helpful in
crafting a middle pathway between the poles of Smith and RFRA, but the
need for such compromises may not as yet be apparent to federal jurists.
The third possible avenue for altering the Hobby Lobby decision
can be addressed through changes in the employer mandate.132 There are
some who have suggested that the Hobby Lobby decision shines a light on
the inadequacy of a system that relies on employer coverage, and by giving
employers power to alter services delineated in essential benefits, it erodes
the integrity of the health reform scheme.133 As such, it has been argued that
a national health insurance structure needs to move away from a
dependency on employer coverage, and adopt a single payer approach.134
While there may be merit in the larger idea of abandoning employer based
health insurance, the reality is that the Affordable Care Act, as presently
constituted, could not exist without integration of the current employee
health benefit scheme, and attempts to move away from such a structure
would require a considerably different health reform architecture. It seems
unlikely that the current federal and state health insurance marketplaces
127. Noel E. Horton, Article I, Section 11: A Poor “Plan B” for Washington’s
Religious Pharmacists, 85 WASH. L. REV. 739, 756 (2010).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 757.
130. See LEE G. STRANG, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FEDERALISM LIMITATIONS ON
STATE AND FEDERAL POWER 184 (2011).
131. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 113–
144 (2d ed. 2014).
132. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(f) (2014).
133. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Illogic of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, NEW
YORK TIMES (July 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/upshot/the-illogic-ofemployer-sponsored-health-insurance.html.
134. Id.
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have the ability, in the short term, to absorb the pressure of millions of
transferred enrollees who would be dependent on exchanges should
employer based coverage be abandoned. In addition, there is widespread
general support for employer based health plans that makes a retreat from
this pillar of ACA coverage even less likely.135
If abandonment of the employer mandate is not feasible, the
question arises as to whether this mandate can somehow be changed. The
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga push back on contraceptive coverage
occurred in the context of an employer mandate littered with exceptions. As
noted, so-called grandfathered plans fell out of the minimum essential
benefits requirements. In addition, DHHS authorized its Health Resources
Administration (HRSA) to establish exemptions for an array of religious
employers, instead requiring insurers and TPAs to offer no cost coverage
options for contraceptive services.136 In essence, the mandate became a
veritable swiss cheese requirement, and the government’s regulatory action
presented the Court with a less restrictive alternative option, which
conditioned the contraceptive coverage obligation in a manner that rendered
it highly compromised. The most logical avenue to follow, for the sake of
women’s public health interests, and the integrity of the law, would be to
reinvigorate the employer coverage mandate for contraceptives services,
refusing exemptions from this obligation for any reason. In effect, the
health mandate could be seen as an absolute legal requirement, which
trumps the odd notion that corporations have the same personal rights as
individual citizens. Both for-profit and non-profit entities enjoy
considerable benefits under federal and state laws, and corporate legal
status, of all types, is a privilege that comes with commensurate rights and
obligations; one of which should entail an obligation to meet the minimum
essential benefit requirements of the ACA.
The reality is, however, that in the face of religious objections in
areas involving women’s health and reproduction, the government has
capitulated and waivered from its commitment to prevention and wellness,
granting a far too wide array of actors exemption from the contraceptive
mandate.137 It is a slippery slope, as the voices against the mandate have
served to push the boundaries beyond the concession of allowing third
parties a government financed opt out, to a point where even a required
filing of an objection to the mandate has been characterized as a violation

135. Sally Pipes, Employer Health Insurance: A Bargain Compared to GovernmentSponsored Coverage, FORBES (July 28, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2014/07/28/employer-health-insurance-a-bargaincompared-to-government-sponsored-coverage.
136. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) (2013).
137. Alan E. Garfield, The Contraceptive Mandate Debate: Achieveing a Sensible
Balance, 114 COLUM. L.REV. SIDEBAR 1, 17 (2014), http://columbialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Garfield-114-Columbia-Law-Review-Sidebar-1.pdf.
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of free exercise.138 What seemed to be the least restrictive way of
approaching women’s public health needs in Hobby Lobby was quickly
turned on its head, as the endorsed workaround requiring submission of a
form to insurers (TPAs) was temporarily enjoined by the Court, giving
credence to an argument that formally invoking the exemption to the
mandate, in and of itself, violated free exercise rights.139 In such a climate it
seems unlikely that the government will find the resolve to withstand the
firestorm of religious objections to bolster the public health mission of the
ACA and reinvigorate the mandate as a much more broader based
obligation for all employers to meet, without exception.
SECTION IV: RESTORING PUBLIC HEALTH: A WELLNESS ACCOUNT
As noted, none of the three avenues highlighted, statutory
amendment, judicial reversal, or reinvigoration of the employer mandate
can be achieved easily. But the need to find a way forward to rebalance
public health governance within the parameters of population need, and
individual right, remains a strong imperative, particularly as it relates to
women’s access to contraceptives. One possible way of proceeding in the
face of the Hobby Lobby ruling, and the growth of third-party voices in the
contraceptive area, is to reconsider whether the goals of wellness and
prevention can be balanced with employer coverage in ways that are not
focused on just achieving government accommodation to corporate
interests. Two key elements, the employer mandate, and the goal of
women’s health via prevention and wellness, need to remain paramount as
drivers of any solution to the public health barrier created by Hobby Lobby.
Any change in the contraceptive mandate area will entail amendments to
138. HHS Issues Two New Contraceptive Coverage Rules Under ACA, CALIFORNIA
HEALTHLINE (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2014/8/25/hhsissues-two-new-contraceptive-coverage-rules-under-aca. The ink was barely dry on the
Hobby Lobby case when three days later the Court in Wheaton College v. Burwell granted
the religious college a preliminary injunction that is now pending appeal. The conditions of
the injunction are such that the applicant need not use the Government prescribed form nor
send copies to the health insurance issuers and third-party administrators. Wheaton Coll. v.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). See also, Jonathan H. Adler, Hobby Lobby is
Decided, But the Fights Over Religious Accommodation are Not, WASH. POST (July 2,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/02/hobbylobby-is-decided-but-the-fights-over-religious-accommodation-are-not/.
139. See Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (2014). More recently in Michigan
Catholic Conference v. Burwell, the MCC petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that
the self certification requirement, applied to religious employers, as modified by Wheaton
College, is a violation of RFRA. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Michigan Catholic
Conference v. Burwell, No. 14-701 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2014). In response the government is
arguing that the MCC objections do not concern notification, but post objection events,
namely the actions of third party insurers. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 13,
Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell, No. 14-701 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2015). The
government argues that the MCC position extends beyond RFRA and constitutes a type of
“religious veto.” Id.
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the ACA; in order to be feasible, such alterations of the law must be
relatively minimal, not alter the basic structure of the reform scheme, and
be politically doable. In addition, a way forward must proceed without the
expectation that there will be changes in free exercise jurisprudence, either
constitutional or statutory, for, as noted, such possibilities are unlikely.
Taking into account the three conditions above, a solution that
would restore the playing field can be achieved by removing wellness and
prevention services from the framework of the current, minimum essential
benefits scheme.140 In lieu of mandating wellness and prevention as one of
the ten minimum essential benefits in the ACA, the 15 required, cost-free
prevention services, could be culled out, together with women’s health care,
and placed in a distinct bundle of services.141 This new service cluster could
be referred to as a wellness account, following a format similar in
conception to a health savings account.142 The wellness account would act
as a type of health care lockbox, supported by a small percentage of
insurance premium dollars, but primarily financed with current federal
funds, already allocated to prevention and wellness.143 These new accounts
would be established for women, and could conceivably expanded to
include special male health needs at some point; they would enable
individuals, with support of their physicians, to select from a menu of no
cost, preventative health benefit offerings. All insurance policies would be
required to include wellness accounts, including individual, small business,
and group policies; employers would have no control over either the
complement of services or an individual’s use of these wellness accounts.
In addition to “traditional” wellness and prevention services, that would
include all FDA approved contraceptives, other, additional wellness options
could also be added. In effect, the health insurance offered under the ACA
(including ERISA plans) becomes a type of public/private hybrid product,
with the wellness account being the public component of the offering, a
mandatory rider include in all policies. While the government will need to
subsidize wellness accounts, it is conceivable that utilization of a carefully

140. The Affordable Care Act and Wellness Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fswellnessprogram.pdf.
141. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725, 8727–28 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45
C.F.R. pt. 147).
142. An HSA is a health savings account that forms the basis of an individual or family
health plan when linked to a high deductible health plan (HDHP). It is likely the best known
of several products that allows individuals to invest pretax dollars into a health account that
can be used to pay for qualified medical expenses. Other types of medical savings accounts
include flexible spending accounts (FSA) and health reimbursement arrangements (HRA).
For a good overview of the various types of medical savings accounts see Internal Revenue
Service, Health Savings Accounts and Other Tax-Favored Health Plans, PUB. 969 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf.
143. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 140.
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designed package of preventative services could foster individual health
maintenance, and stave off costly health insurance expenditures.
A wellness account approach is a carve out that removes the ability
of an employer to object to the purchase of health insurance that covers
contraceptive services that clash with religious beliefs, falling outside the
ambit of employer coverage. Access to contraceptives fits within a
supplemental lockbox, and the choice to use the included prevention and
wellness services in such a lockbox, including various methods of
contraception, is a matter of personal selection and individual right,
removed from the free exercise scruples of third-party corporations. The
wellness account would do more than restore the matter of women’s health
to the more characteristic parameters of employee health benefit choice and
privacy, but holds the potential to enhance the health promotional goals of
the ACA. More broadly, the wellness account is compatible with
Obamacare’s foci on patient centric care, as well as team based medicine
and service coordination, and could provide a valuable tool in the
Administration’s quest to build new delivery models.144
While the ACA advances a number of no cost preventative health
measures as a core feature of the law’s minimum essential benefits and
Women’s Health Amendments, the scheme could do more to affirmatively
support utilization of these services. A core principal of health wellness is
the need for patient engagement, as experience in this area has
demonstrated that individual cooperation is a key variable in prevention.145
While providing certain services without cost sharing incentivizes patients
to seek care, additionally, a wellness account shifts responsibility and
choice to individuals, as its use requires patients to be actively engaged in
charting key aspects of their own health care. The account could be
structured to provide additional services to individuals, and afford financial
rewards for the insured that utilize this service package. A wellness account
would require the individual to work with a clinician who would assist with
selection and coordination of given services. The provider, in turn, could be
incented to coordinate the wellness package, and a pay for performance
arrangement, seen in various ACA demonstrations, could be extended into
this arena.146 In the matter of contraceptives, coverage would be placed in
the wellness account lockbox and incentives would be provided to women
and their caregivers to select these services based on health factors and a
woman’s choice.
144. HHS Secretary Announces $840 Million Initiative to Improve Patient Care and
Lower Costs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/10/20141023a.html.
145. Judith H. Hibbard & Jessica Greene, What the Evidence Shows About Patient
Activation: Better Health Outcomes & Care experiences, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2013, at 207,
211.
146. See Julia James, Health Policy Briefs: Pay for Performance, HEALTH AFF. (Oct.
11, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_78.pdf.
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The wellness account, proposed herein, is shaped on the more
conventional formats of medical savings accounts but departs from these
models, as it is not a tax savings vehicle.147 It may, however, be structured
in ways that recognize utilization of preventative services by offering
individuals expanded coverages in the next calendar year, provided
wellness services had been used, and could further reward individuals for
the creation of a coordinated care plan to augment their wellness accounts.
As noted, the wellness account would also be expanded to include men and
their particular health needs. This template also affords the opportunity to
explore more routine insurance coverage for non-traditional, licensed
therapies and provide a forum in which to vet the efficacies of an array of
complimentary treatment modalities.148 In addition, the rather complex
rules involving non-discrimination in wellness plans would not apply to the
idea being posited here.149 Practically speaking, details concerning a
wellness account would need to be carefully evaluated in reference to
potential discrimination, as well as an array of other applied legal matters
such as employment law, tax issues, and insurance regulations. As noted,
the creation of a wellness account would require amendments to the
Affordable Care Act and commensurate regulatory and bureaucratic
development to allow for the implementation of this new supplemental
insurance vehicle.
SECTION V: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
If the recent past is a guide, the field of public health holds many
diverse and profound challenges, and government actors will be hard
pressed to meet demands from areas as complex as pandemics to global
warming as they attempt to strike a balance with more traditional core
functions in health monitoring, assessment, and treatment.150 The Ebola
threat in the U.S. (and around the globe) is a dramatic example of the types
of pressures that await health authorities, and an illustration of how the
parameters of health decision making need to be coalesced around science,
population protection, and individual liberties. While the stakes in public
health policy generally may not be as high as those faced in Ebola,
147. See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 142.
148. Under § 2706 of the ACA licensed CAM therapies are required to be covered, but
enforcement of this non-discrimination provision has not been forthcoming. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-5 (2014).
149. The discrimination rules are directed to employers, requiring them to structure
wellness programs in ways that do not result in disparate treatment based on health status.
Lisa Guerin, Final Rules for Wellness Programs Under Obamacare, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/final-rules-wellness-programs-underobamacare.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
150. See The Public Health System and the 10 Essential Public Health, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nphpsp/essentialServices.html
(last updated May 29, 2014).
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nonetheless the exercise of government police power across all key areas of
this critical role of government should not be compromised in ways that
detract from the work at hand.
Health promotion is an essential, long-standing arena of public
health concern, driven by individual and population considerations, and
now by the access, cost, and quality goals of the Affordable Care Act.
Within the framework of wellness a critical area of focus is women’s
health, and within the panoply of services that classification covers, none is
more critical than the availability of contraceptives.151 The public health
obligations to women’s health promotion, and all that entails, including
access to contraceptive services, are central goals of health policy, and
those goals must be pursued with the same ardor and urgency as other more
immediate public health challenges.152 This is not to suggest that health
policy making in women’s health or other arenas of health promotion can
occur without a keen awareness of legal and moral parameters, and that
compromises must be made to advance public welfare. In particular,
individual liberties must not be seen as extraneous to public health policy
formation, but are integral considerations in development and execution of
these endeavors. To argue against the inclusion of matters such as the
151. Guaranteeing Contraceptive Coverage in All New Health Insurance Plans, NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/guaranteeing_cont_covg_in_all_new_health_ins
urance_plans_081312.pdf.
Contraception is Critical Preventive Health Care for Women

Contraceptive use is nearly universal among women of reproductive age in the
United States. Most women have the biological potential for pregnancy for over 30
years of their lives, and for approximately three-quarters of her reproductive life,
the average woman is trying to postpone or avoid pregnancy.

Planned pregnancies—which for most women require contraception—improve
women’s health. The ability to determine the timing of a pregnancy can prevent a
range of pregnancy complications that can endanger a woman’s health, including
gestational diabetes, high blood pressure, and placental problems, among others.

An unintended pregnancy may have significant implications for a woman’s health.
A preexisting health condition such as diabetes, hypertension, reflux esophagitis,
lower extremity or lumbar arthritis, and coronary artery disease, may be worsened
by a pregnancy.

Contraception is critical to helping women achieve healthy pregnancies. Women
who wait for some time after delivery before conceiving their next child lower
their risk of adverse perinatal outcomes, including low birth weight, preterm birth,
and small-for-size gestational age. And a planned pregnancy affords women an
opportunity to make behavioral changes that lead to better birth outcomes.

Many contraceptives have significant preventive benefits beyond their
contraceptive benefits. Oral contraceptives, for example, lower rates of pelvic
inflammatory disease, cancers of the ovary and endometrium, recurrent ovarian
cysts, benign breast cysts, and fibroadenomas.
152. Women’s Health Under the Affordable Care Act, NURSING 360 (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www.nursing360.com/womens-health-under-the-affordable-care-act/.
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freedom of religion defies our legal tradition, but religious rights must be
appropriately invoked by those who legitimately possess them, and should
not inappropriately coopt legitimate concerns of governance.
The Supreme Court decision in Hobby Lobby upends the field of
public health by allowing the free exercise rights of unrelated third parties
to trump population health goals and the individual liberty concerns of
women who are directly impacted by the contraceptive mandate.153 The
minority opinion in Hobby Lobby reflects the nature of the push back
against this decision generally, and provides a skillful articulation of the
reasons why, in both legal and public health terms, the government’s
position should have been viewed as compelling. While the Court found a
less restrictive pathway to meet the government’s goals for women’s health,
ironically it was DHHS that opened this door as a result of its liberal grant
of exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. While such appeasement may
have been viewed as a practical necessity, it was not compelled by law, and
in retrospective, only served to weaken the government’s public health
objectives. It is not outside the realm of possibility that a future court may
view the RFRA statute as less empowering, and not so expansive as to
include a corporation within its scope. But, for the present, it must be
conceded that it will be difficult to overcome the Hobby Lobby
interpretation of RFRA, and its narrowly tailored approach to compelling
interest presents a very high bar to regulators. Rather, in the wake of Hobby
Lobby, it seems that the expansive view of “person” articulated by the
Court under RFRA is likely to be expanded beyond the scope of privately
held corporations to other for-profit corporate actors, posing even greater
problems.
Public health challenges, whether they be the threat of Ebola, or the
critical needs of women to access contraceptives will persist, and so it is
essential that our legal system facilitate, and not hamper, how policy
makers craft responses in these areas. In the face of Hobby Lobby, and its
embellishment of corporate religious rights as of primary import, alternative
strategies to public health must be developed to circumvent this new status
quo. The wellness account recommended herein, is not a bold legal plan,
but rather a mild alteration of the ACA that seeks to remove employers
from the arch of decision making in the health prevention area. It is,
however, not just an accommodation, but rather a measure rooted in public
health, allowing for reproductive health decisions to be matters of health
care treatment and individual choice. While Hobby Lobby may serve to
meet the interests of religious rights for a new group of actors, it does a
disservice to the public’s health, and as such, underscores the need for
immediate and practical regulatory solutions; a wellness account is one
such solution.

153. INST. OF MED., supra note 92, at 19.
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